Georgia on my Mind

A few thoughts on the trouble in Georgia:

1. The rapid introduction of Russian land, air and naval forces indicates that this was planned some months ago.

2. The Russians are in South Osettia to stay. They reject neutral peackeepers and will allow only their forces to remain in place.

3. The Russians will be happy with nothing less than "regime change" in Tibilisi. They want to show the other former Soviet states that they will not tolerate strong relations with the west, exemplified by NATO membership, or democracy in these former Soviet republics. They prefer the status qua ante, and for the Russian it refers to the time before the demise of the Soviet Union.

4. The Russian claim that their invasion was a response to the Georgian offensive to reclaim their breakaway province of South Osettia. However, the Georgian offensive began this past Friday, and it is obvious from its broad scope on land and sea, that the Russian military "response" was planned long ago for forces to be appropriately positioned for their actions. As stated in the knowledgeable web site Abu Muqawama:(and Georgia is on their mind, too!)

The Russian military happened to be ramping up for this week. Their response would not have been so swift if they were caught by surprise. This was pre-planned trap by having S.O. militias provoke a Georgian military response.

5. One of the more interesting reasons that I've herd for the massive Russian action has to do with oil. The always interesting Debka website posits:

Jerusalem owns a strong interest in Caspian oil and gas pipelines reach the Turkish terminal port of Ceyhan, rather than the Russian network. Intense negotiations are afoot between Israel Turkey, Georgia, Turkmenistan and Azarbaijan for pipelines to reach Turkey and thence to Israel’s oil terminal at Ashkelon and on to its Red Sea port of Eilat. From there, supertankers can carry the gas and oil to the Far East through the Indian Ocean.

Aware of Moscow’s sensitivity on the oil question, Israel offered Russia a stake in the project but was rejected.

Last year, the Georgian president commissioned from private Israeli security firms several hundred military advisers, estimated at up to 1,000, to train the Georgian armed forces in commando, air, sea, armored and artillery combat tactics. They also offer instruction on military intelligence and security for the central regime. Tbilisi also purchased weapons, intelligence and electronic warfare systems from Israel.

These advisers were undoubtedly deeply involved in the Georgian army’s preparations to conquer the South Ossetian capital Friday.

In recent weeks, Moscow has repeatedly demanded that Jerusalem halt its military assistance to Georgia, finally threatening a crisis in bilateral relations. Israel responded by saying that the only assistance rendered Tbilisi was “defensive.”

This has not gone down well in the Kremlin. Therefore, as the military crisis intensifies in South Ossetia, Moscow may be expected to punish Israel for its intervention.

DEBKA also considers the overall strategic impact of the Russian moves.

While the world’s attention was fixed on the Russian-Georgian contest over two breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, DEBKAfile’s exclusive military sources reveal that Russia has massed a fleet of warships and marine forces opposite the Gerogia's semi-autonomous Black Sea region of Ajaria.

Moscow is preparing to punish what it regards as Georgian president Mikhail Saakashvili’s further provocations by occupying this coastal strip on Georgia’s southwestern border with Turkey.

The appearance of Ukraine’s president Viktor Yushchenko alongside Saakashvili, leaders of the pro-Western Orange and Rose Revolutions, at a huge national rally outside the Georgian parliament in Tbilisi Tuesday night, Aug. 12, may well be seen by the Kremlin as over the top. It came hours after Russian President Dimitry Medvedev’s gesture to the European mediation bid of ordering the Russian military operation in Georgia halted there and then.

Half of Ajaria’s ethnically Georgian population professes Islam, in contrast to the country’s Christian majority. The other half is Russian.

Ajarian has come to mean a Georgian Muslim.

The Russian Black Sea buildup is deployed opposite the Ajurian capital of Batumi, an important port for the shipment of oil from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Its oil refinery handles Caspian oil from Azerbaijan.

When Saakashvili was elected president five years ago, the region’s leaders refused to recognize his authority and maintained close ties with Moscow up until May 2004 when, after Ajurians demonstrated against Tbilisi, he ordered them to obey the Georgian constitution and disarm.

Russia maintained a military base at Batumi which it agreed to close by November 2007.

DEBKAfile’s sources report that by recovering the base, Moscow will not only punish the Georgian president, but also profit from the turmoil of the past week in three ways:

1. A third semi-autonomous province will be hacked off Georgian territory after the loss of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

2. Russia will gain a strategic Black Sea foothold at Turkey’s back door.

3. It will also control a gateway to Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and Armenia.

Note that these former Soviet states have come into the western orbit over the past few years.

Here is another interesting explanation of the Georgia-Russia war that hearkens back to post WW1 Europe:

The current situation is not wholly without precedent, but instead calls to mind the landscape of the Caucasus after WWI. In the wake of the Russian Revolutions and the disintegration of the Russian Empire in 1917, Wilhelmine Germany encouraged Georgian Mensheviks in May 1918 to proclaim Georgia a sovereign and independent state. Even as it was still engaged in a titanic struggle against France, Britain and the United States, Germany had its eyes on the future exploitation of the Caucasus and had identified Georgia as the key to control of the export of Caucasian and Caspian resources, and of oil in particular. In a similar way, the US and the EU have regarded the independence of Georgia as critical for the diversification of export routes for Eurasian energy resources beyond Russian (and Iranian) control.

[...]

The current situation is not wholly without precedent, but instead calls to mind the landscape of the Caucasus after WWI. In the wake of the Russian Revolutions and the disintegration of the Russian Empire in 1917, Wilhelmine Germany encouraged Georgian Mensheviks in May 1918 to proclaim Georgia a sovereign and independent state. Even as it was still engaged in a titanic struggle against France, Britain and the United States, Germany had its eyes on the future exploitation of the Caucasus and had identified Georgia as the key to control of the export of Caucasian and Caspian resources, and of oil in particular. In a similar way, the US and the EU have regarded the independence of Georgia as critical for the diversification of export routes for Eurasian energy resources beyond Russian (and Iranian) control.

[...]

Washington thus may well find itself facing a much bigger and messier crisis than it had ever bargained for in backing the youthful but perhaps too dynamic Saakashvili. It is difficult to argue that Georgia itself is a vital US interest ( ensuring a diversity of energy supplies is a real and growing concern for the EU, but the EU has little leverage with which to use against Russia). Moreover, as Moscow as only too aware, Washington has enough problems to contend with, ranging from Iraq, a worsening situation in Afghanistan, the probability of a nuclear armed Iran, and a domestic economy headed into recession. Yet with Georgian forces in Iraq and Georgia’s status as a candidate for NATO membership, Washington will find it difficult to wash its hands of Georgia without suffering a major loss of face and credibility. Moscow would find few outcomes more gratifying than that.